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I. Introduction: Context of Private Power in Financial Markets
Markets for financing personal, corporate and governmental activity became a central feature of economic life in the industrial and post-industrial age. During the last quarter of the twentieth century, measures of liberalization in regulatory oversight of those markets were accompanied by a heightened degree of complexity in transactions, as banks and other entities increasingly deployed a wider range of instruments and operated across national borders. A conjunction of factors related to these trends culminated in the global financial crisis (GFC) of [2007] [2008] and, arguably, a continuing banking and fiscal crisis within the Eurozone.
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The nature and appropriateness of both governmental and business power in the governance arrangements for these markets is contested. To those who argued that light touch regulation of financial markets tended to remove the state from a key role, there is a reminder that state activity is necessarily constitutive of private market activity generally; and in financial markets in particular.
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Those who blamed the GFC on excessive dependence on self-regulation, and expected private governance to be replaced with public regulation at every turn have had their expectations defied.
There is evidence of the continuing importance of private regulation across key aspects of financial behaviour. Hence, the relationship between businesses and governments in the regulation of transnational financial markets has changed, but not necessarily with the effect of excluding businesses and their associations from regulatory roles. The GFC has shown up and demanded greater scrutiny of private governance arrangements, and also created a dynamic within which certain of these arrangements have been questioned. There has thus been a degree of movement towards greater governmental and inter-governmental activity in indirect monitoring of private regulation, as well as direct regulation of markets; notably over-thecounter (OTC) derivatives. 4 Accordingly, this has resulted in a substantial re-engagement of public supervisory authorities with these financial instruments; including, for instance, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) 5 and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 6 in the US, as well as the European Commission 7 and Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) 8 in the EU. Public authorities from major jurisdictions are also attempting to coordinate cross-border implementation of reforms, for example through the OTC Derivatives Supervisors Group (ODSG) 9 , OTC Derivatives Regulators Forum (ODRF) 10 and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) . 11 This coordination is partly driven by concerns regarding the potential for fragmentation and arbitrage to emerging derivative markets ('EDMs') and 'offshore' jurisdictions.
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In this context, regulatory relationships in financial markets exemplify the importance and changing nature of transnational business governance interactions (TBGI) which, centrally, extend beyond state regulation of market actors, to interaction with transnational private regulatory 13 arrangements established and operated by industry actors. This interaction involves, but is not limited to, governmental scrutiny of private governance arrangements. Indeed, in some regimes governments are themselves subjects rather than overseers of private governance. In this paper we examine one key case of private governance in financial markets: the emergence, structures and decision-making of Credit Derivatives Determinations Committees (DCs) of the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA).
The DCs are of particular significance because their role extends beyond the more common standard-setting functions exhibited by many private bodies within transnational regulatory regimes, to embrace key aspects of interpretation and implementation. The DCs determine when 'credit events' under CDS contracts have occurred, triggering a stream of payments, payable only if such events occur. These decisions can profoundly affect the financial positions both of larger corporate actors and of states, as well as the banks which fund them. Therefore, the emergence and implications of the DCs will be the key focus of this chapter, although the broader context within which the DCs were established and operate will also be reviewed, as it offers panoply of instructive examples of TBGI within a single regulatory regime.
II. ISDA, Pathways of Interaction and the Impact of the GFC
The governance of OTC derivatives transactions has grown to be a key example of transnational business governance interactions (TBGI) in which the requirements of market actors for a degree of coordination so as to reduce transaction costs has been met by a form of private standard-setting; with a wider structure of activity associated with the implementation of the standards, and with some dynamic engagement of public authorities in oversight and steering. 14 Therefore, this paper will highlight the following mechanisms or 'pathways' of interaction between the relevant actors, encompassing ISDA, governments, courts and public regulators: -ISDA's standard-setting through the Master Agreement and associated documentation; -ISDA's lobbying and other activities in support of the Master Agreement and attempts to shape the broader regulatory regime for OTC derivatives; -ISDA's intervention as amicus curiae in court cases involving the Master Agreement and that raise important policy issues for ISDA; -ISDA's advisory role, including to sovereigns, on systemically important events in the OTC derivatives markets; and -Of key interest in this paper, ISDA's central role in reforming settlement mechanisms in the CDS market following the GFC, notably with the encouragement of public actors; resulting in ISDA itself maintaining a key regulatory role in this space.
Before moving to consider these pathways of interaction, we outline the direction of growth and significance of the markets in derivatives transactions for context. We will then consider in greater detail the governance opportunity which led to the emergence of the peak private governance organisation: ISDA.
a) Growth and Changing Purposes of Derivative Transactions
Derivative instruments have been defined as agreements between two counterparties where:
'the payoffs to and from each counterparty depend on the outcome of one or more extrinsic, future, uncertain events or metrics -that is, they are "aleatory contracts" -and in which one counterparty expects such outcome to be opposite to that expected by the other counterparty'.
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Derivatives proliferate in form but share at least one commonality in that they embody a value which is intrinsically linked or contingent upon some external item of worth; hence they 'derive' their value from something else, referred to as the 'underlying'. 16 Depending on the type of derivative, the underlying can be a broad range of instruments. These include stocks, bonds, currencies, interest rates, energy, commodities, the weather, 17 and mortality rates, 18 for example.
Of particular interest for the purposes of this chapter are derivatives which are contingent on third party or instrument credit quality,single corporation or sovereign ('single-name CDS') or a portfolio of reference entities. 20 As well as offering the possibility to hedge credit exposure to an underlying reference entity, CDS positions can also effectively act as proxies for adopting speculative positions on relative price movements in underlying reference bonds. 25 (to which we will return later in this chapter).
Throughout history privately negotiated tailored ('bespoke') derivatives have also been traded in the shadow of organised exchanges on an 'over-the-counter' (OTC) basis. Initially, the common law and statutory provisions in major trading jurisdictions were inhospitable to these instruments, largely due to their perceived propensity to inflate speculative bubbles and facilitate significant losses with potentially wider implications. 26 Moralistic concerns also stoked suspicion of these instruments in earlier periods. 27 Once public policy towards OTC derivatives, particularly the burgeoning swaps Intermediaries, such as inter-dealer brokers, and professional services firms, including the major law and accountancy houses, also play important supporting roles in the OTC derivative markets in general.
According to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) the OTC (including CDS) market is considerably larger than the exchange-traded (ET) segment in notional terms 34 , though it must also be emphasised that headline notional measurements do not reflect mark-to-market and 'netting'-related adjustments, coupled with collateralisation; which together generate a smaller 'net notional' figure. 35 Nonetheless, the OTC derivative markets, and the key players within them, are systemically significant 36 and immediately prior to the GFC they were susceptible to less direct public regulatory oversight than the ET segment. 37 In particular, the OTC derivatives markets generally lacked the well- ISDA's mantra, as well as that of its allies in this period, was that OTC derivative markets were niche and technical but nonetheless capable of fulfilling generally beneficial economic functions. It was posited that a significant degree of direct public regulatory oversight was unwarranted and that 'sophisticated' industry participants were capable of safely self-regulating. The existence of an established boilerplate contract, such as the Master Agreement, and related documentation was undoubtedly a powerful 'signal' 52 to public actors in this regard. But it must also be stressed that ISDA's stance was deemed credible at the time and attracted considerable support, not least from high profile public policy makers. Related to these activities, ISDA commissions legal opinions for members on the enforceability of its Master Agreement and associated collateral (security) arrangements across jurisdictions. 63 In fact, the deployment of collateral, which aims to secure contracts and mitigate fallout in the event of default, has played (and will likely continue to play) a highly significant regulatory role in the OTC Aside from this, ISDA has occasionally engaged in other types of activities which have similarly influenced the terms of reference within which its standards and norms operate and, in so doing, inevitably brought it into close contact with public actors. These activities have also served to illustrate the sheer extent of ISDA's power in the financial markets. For example, Anna Gelpern has highlighted an intriguing incident in 1998 whereby the Japanese Government approached ISDA for advice in relation to the distressed Long-Term Credit Bank ('LTCB'). 71 Following this approach and discussions with the Japanese authorities, ISDA agreed to issue a statement with a view to providing clarity and calming the markets in the context of LTCB's nationalisation. ISDA's statement has been branded by Gelpern as a 'private "no action letter" of sorts -that pre-empted a rush for the exits'.
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If such a statement were to be issued by a national government, it could be considered an instrument of soft law. Over time, ISDA's perceived technical expertise in these areas has rendered it a natural advisor on broader systemically important developments in the OTC derivatives markets, including those which have attracted the attention of sovereigns; as exemplified in the Japanese LTCB incident and as will be highlighted further below in relation to the post-GFC deliberations of public regulators in major OTC derivative jurisdictions. Similar to the IEC, it is difficult to argue that ISDA has not actively sought pre-eminence. In fact, there is ample evidence that ISDA has explicitly done so, especially given that ISDA's lobbying positions frequently equate optimal outcomes in the OTC derivatives markets with adherence to ISDA's own standards and norms. In principle, the fallout from the GFC theoretically had the potential to challenge this dynamic, especially ISDA's focal role. But, as will be illustrated, what actually occurred following the GFC was perhaps closer to 'institutional layering' in many respects. 84 In other words, due to its dominance and perhaps the perceived costs associated with creating an entirely new regulatory regime, ISDA was actually endowed with new responsibilities by public actors, exemplified by the establishment of the DCs. This effectively added adjudication and interpretative responsibilities with respect to a systemically important segment of the OTC derivatives markets to ISDA's existing regulatory repertoire, which already included standard-setting, norm promotion and advisory functions. Before moving to consider this in more detail, it is first necessary to review the GFC for context. though its severity arguably does distinguish it from previous panics. 86 It is unlikely that the GFC will be the last market disruption to have a derivatives-related hue either. 87 But it is also generally accepted that OTC derivatives did not, in and of themselves, prompt the collapse of major institutions and trigger the GFC. ; the form and implementation of pre-GFC public 85 See, e.g., P.M. Garber, 'Famous First Bubbles ' (1990) Accordingly, while AIG's specific situation may have technically been sui generis, the fact remains that AIG's foray into the CDS markets and subsequent difficulties generated negative externalities. US authorities were compelled to support AIG with public funding, thereby also ensuring that AIG's outstanding obligations on its OTC derivatives portfolio were honoured. 102 In sum, the rescue of AIG generated a social cost. Of course, AIG was not the only financial institution to require publiclyfunded assistance in the throes of the GFC but is illustrative for present purposes insofar as its exposure to CDS's was a key factor in its collapse.
In the wake of the GFC and related institutional and market failures, the G20 nations resolved to overhaul infrastructure in the OTC derivatives markets. 103 This agenda, which is being monitored by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) 104 , demands, inter alia, increased central clearing and/or exchange (or platform) trading of OTC derivatives where appropriate, as well as enhanced risk management practices and public reporting generally. At time of writing, G20 jurisdictions are at various stages of implementation, with the largest US 105 and EU 106 markets most advanced. Aside from these direct market infrastructure reforms, other elements of public regulatory reform on both sides of the Atlantic are also likely to impinge on the manner and extent to which certain banking entities will be permitted to engage in OTC derivative trading 107 issued a (somewhat controversial) 110 regulation specifically concerned with short selling and CDS which elaborates certain restrictions and notification requirements for purely speculative ('uncovered') sovereign CDS, subject to exemptions. 111 This is only a high-level snapshot of the array of public regulatory reforms now underway in the financial sector. However, perhaps tellingly, the market infrastructure reform agenda has not sought to fundamentally challenge certain norms which became embedded in the OTC derivatives markets since the late 1980s, and which are important to ISDA. For example, OTC derivatives trading will continue, in general, 112 to operate outside the purview of gambling and insurance laws in major jurisdictions, irrespective of the economic purpose of transactions. 113 Overall therefore, public actors have not 'thrown out the baby with the bathwater', especially given that ISDA has, for instance, been utilised by major public regulatory authorities as a conduit for communicating with major market participants on the implementation of market infrastructure reforms. In turn, ISDA has reorganised its internal structures in order to streamline these interactions and to prepare its members for incoming regulatory reforms, 114 as well as seeking to afford a stronger voice to 'buy side' members and other relevant stakeholders.
It is thus clear that ISDA, for its part, has at least outwardly embraced the general objectives of public regulatory reform, 115 though has also not hesitated to robustly challenge aspects of implementation, particularly through its revamped public relations machine. 116 Moreover, certain reforms in the OTC derivatives markets have arguably seen ISDA actually increase its influence in some respects; exemplified by the establishment of the DCs. This influence and retention of 'regulatory share' 117 has, however, occasionally brought with it certain pressures and expectations from the direction of public actors and other stakeholders. 110 See, e.g., International Monetary Fund, 'Chapter 2: A New Look at the Role of Sovereign Credit Default
III. The Emergence and Significance of the ISDA Credit Derivatives Determinations Committees
As the GFC began to bite in March 2008, the US President's Working Group on Financial Markets 118 (PWG) issued a policy statement outlining its assessment of the roots of market turmoil and recommendations for addressing it. 119 The prevailing industry settlement process for credit derivatives was amongst the issues which attracted the attention of the PWG.
a) Settlement Concerns
The PWG policy statement noted risks relating to settlement backlogs, particularly in credit derivatives, which had occurred prior to the GFC. The potential implications of this cannot be underestimated. For instance, it has been highlighted that for every 100 credit derivative contracts entered into by a major dealer bank in 2005, there were approximately 1,000 'aged unconfirmed' trades outstanding. 120 Patently, this generated a degree of legal uncertainty, as well as broader riskrelated concerns. Accordingly, under public regulatory pressure and the threat of intervention the industry, spearheaded by ISDA, undertook to reduce confirmations backlogs, particularly through increased automation processes. By 2007 the industry had largely achieved this across many product classes, including in credit derivatives.
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While acknowledging industry efforts with respect to trade 'compression', the PWG harboured concerns that market participants had not achieved a 'steady state'; noting unnerving spikes in backlogs of unconfirmed trades in credit derivatives in July and August 2007. 122 The PWG also outlined its broader reservations in relation to industry settlement processes for CDS. Prior to the GFC, CDS market participants retained a degree of flexibility as to how exactly a contract could be settled upon the occurrence of a triggering 'credit event'. Market participants could decide on a case-by-case basis as to whether they preferred 'physical settlement', requiring protection buyers to actually deliver defaulted securities to the protection seller in return for CDS payout, or traditional 'cash settlement'. ISDA had developed a 'voluntary auction protocol' prior to the GFC seeking to streamline cash settlement processes but it had not been adopted industry-wide at the onset of the GFC.
Such divergences in settlement processes presented a particular problem for systemically important dealer banks 123 acting as market-makers in CDS transactions. Dealers attempting to ensure that their intermediated transactions were 'offsetting' from a risk-management perspective could be fatally DCs are not mandated to accompany their 'Yes' or 'No' decisions with detailed reasoning, though this is not precluded either. 145 However, in August 2012 ISDA amended the DC Rules to facilitate the publication of a summary 'Meeting Statement', 146 though the informational value of these statements may vary somewhat from case to case. 147 Nonetheless, external review panels are seemingly expected to prepare a summary and analysis of their decisions and for these to be published by ISDA, 148 though it is worth noting that the external review process is rarely invoked.
c) Private Governance, Public Implications: The Regulatory and Normative Salience of the DCs
The establishment of the DCs presents an interesting case study given that, in the final analysis, they emerged in response to pressures from public actors. In fact, the overall auction hardwiring process, of which the DCs form part, was explicitly welcomed by key public regulators. 149 But, notwithstanding the potential for the DCs to exert third party effects (including for sovereigns), public actors did not demonstrate an interest in becoming involved in the DC process per se; thereby implicitly delegating that space to private self-regulation.
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The concentrated nature of the OTC derivative markets, particularly on the dealer bank side, is relevant in attempting to contextualise the DCs. A theory put forth by Daniel Mügge may be quite instructive in this respect. 151 Mügge reasons that where industries become dominated by a group of 'producer' firms, particularly those which organise themselves through trade associations, they can, despite exogenous shocks, be well positioned to define aspects of regulatory reform agendas from the outset. Or, as Mügge puts it, 'suggest "solutions" to problems they themselves helped define'.
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Accordingly, where dominant firms are faced with regulatory overhaul they may be capable of successfully warding off public intervention in certain complex areas (in this case CDS determinations) by offering '"tightened" self-regulation in return for public "oversight"'.
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Through this, private actors can seek to construct a 'cognitive and political community, taking the role of the creator of the rules of the game'. 154 However, the success of this endeavour can be uncertain. Huault and Rainelli-Le Montagner suggest that the creation of 'new rules of the game' in a technical market (such as OTC derivatives) still might not 'be expected to favour the adhesion of other actors who feel technically handicapped and uncertain about the potential opportunism of a small group of active promoters'. 155 Predictably, the composition of, and powers assumed by, the 146 [http://www2.isda.org/news/isda-publishes-amendments-to-the-credit-derivatives-determinations- DCs provoked debate in certain quarters from the outset. In particular, the potential for conflicts of interest on the DCs attracted comment. A senior individual at a major international law firm summed up the challenge facing the DCs as follows:
'The DC is new, so any time there is a grey area you're going to get tension between dealers and buy side. But the DC has helped bring some certainty to the process, and it's a massive improvement on each individual party making its own decision and people holding off in the market to see what others do'.
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Another derivative market participant has observed: 'It's fair to say there is a concern that somebody might be biased towards their book, but in reality it's 15 firms making the decision, and the net effect tends to be pretty neutral. If someone's arguing something clearly biased, they'll lose all credibility. People know there is a huge public and regulatory focus on the DC, and no one wants to be that person'. 157 ISDA itself has also mounted a defence of the DCs on the basis that the vast majority of questions considered by the DCs are technical, straightforward and efficiently settled; that the 80 per cent supermajority mitigates conflicts of interests; and DC members are, in any event, obligated to observe relevant public regulations, such as anti-manipulation provisions. On the face of it, ISDA's contentions carry merit insofar as the vast majority of the determinations issued by the DCs do seem to attract little or no public comment or interest. Aside from this, market participants have also questioned what other alternative structure could be viable, as expressed in the following terms:
'If you want a product that everyone can trade that isn't reliant on bilateral triggers then you need a public committee. And it makes sense for the people most interested in the product to be on that'.
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Others have been considerably less charitable regarding the DC mechanism. For instance, Lisa Pollack, writing for the Financial Times, observed the following at the height of the DC for Europe's lengthy deliberations as to whether a CDS credit event occurred following the nationalisation of Dutch institution SNS Reaal: 159 'These guys can vote however they wish, it's not that they are subject to any law other than that which they set for themselves (hush, hush now, financial stability is safe with them)...unlike the real, legal, world, the committee members are not obligated to abide by any precedents they set. So the concern about going against previous decisions is a question of fashion alone'. 160 Aside from this ongoing debate regarding the efficiency and predictability of the DC mechanism, there have clearly been instances where DC determinations, as well as the background dynamics of those determinations, have triggered a wider public interest and exerted identifiable third party effects. This has especially been the case in relation to determinations which have involved more complex questions and, in particular, where the reference entity has been a sovereign or a publicly 156 C. Whittall, 'IFR -Defending the ISDA Determinations Committee', Reuters (8 August 2011): available at supported financial institution. In these cases it is evident that determinations of the ISDA DCs can be 'socially significant'.
i) Greece
Perhaps one of the most controversial and high profile recent examples of a DC becoming embroiled in an event of public interest was in the context of the 'quasi-voluntary' Greek sovereign debt restructuring exercise with private creditors 161 which came to a head in March 2012. 162 Given the relative opacity and size of the CDS markets, and resulting interconnectedness amongst systemically important participants, the public policy dilemma was stark. 163 And it quickly became clear to public policy makers and CDS market participants alike that the DC for Europe occupied a pivotal position in this saga. Ultimately, in March 2012 and following the activation of retroactive collection action clauses (CACs) 164 by the Greek authorities (binding private creditors holding Greek law-governed bonds) the DC for Europe determined that a restructuring credit event had occurred for the purposes of Greek CDS's. 165 But, as Anna Gelpern and Mitu Gulati have illustrated, 166 this determination appears to have been preceded by a considerable degree of background jockeying amongst public and private stakeholders, leading to periods of uncertainty and intriguing incidents, worth exploring here.
In July 2011, at an earlier stage in negotiations on this restructuring exercise, ISDA published a 'Greek Sovereign Debt Q&A' on its website which, inter alia, explained the DC process as well as the usual criteria for a restructuring credit event to occur. By way of a further update issued in October 2011 ISDA suggested that, while it was premature for a DC determination on the matter, it appeared to ISDA that the terms of a potential restructuring which were being discussed at that particular time were unlikely to constitute a 'restructuring credit event' triggering CDS contracts. 167 Gelpern and Gulati have branded this intervention 'extraordinary' in the circumstances and venture that it 'could not have been made without consulting with -perhaps even some prodding from -at least some of the This was not the first time the DC for Europe was asked to consider a potential subordination in the context of sovereign distress. Such a question had, for instance, arisen in 2011 in the wake of International Monetary Fund (IMF) financial assistance to Ireland (albeit in the context of a different fact pattern). 171 The posture of the DC in the Greek case has been deemed by Gelpern and Gulati to be 'defensible' in a technical sense. However, they also contend that, in a practical sense, 'no one with even a passing knowledge of the situation had any doubt that the only rationale for the ECB swap was to treat its bonds better than those held by private creditors'. 172 In that same determination, the DC also confirmed that the passage of Greek legislation retroactively amending Greek law-governed bonds to insert CACs did not, in and of itself, amount to a restructuring credit event. This also caused consternation in certain quarters, which was acknowledged by the manager of a hedge fund which actually sat on the DC. He commented immediately afterwards: 'If I were a buyer of protection on Greece and have [sic] seen the result this morning in terms of no protection, then I would be upset'. 173 In any event, the Greek authorities did subsequently activate the CACs and the DC for Europe duly confirmed on 9 March 2012 that this activation constituted a CDS-triggering restructuring credit event. An auction would subsequently be held to settle the CDS obligations 174 which turned out to be less problematic than was perhaps initially feared; 175 though, nonetheless, given the controversy around certain aspects of the Greek event ISDA has since proposed certain revisions to its Credit Derivatives Definitions. 176 More generally, the Greek CDS event and background manoeuvrings carried clear implications for third party stakeholders and fuelled concerns amongst certain market participants regarding the appropriateness of the DC mechanism in these instances. The general challenge was summed up by one derivatives lawyer as follows:
'Some people are certainly concerned they're being manipulated by the dealers...On technical points, the DC is fine. The problem is for larger decisions like Greece...It's not a perfect mechanism for big issues that affect a large amount of people to be decided by a small portion of the overall market'.
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As has also been observed in an IOSCO report, while the sovereign CDS markets survived the Greek event it 'brought to the forefront several doubts on the future of this market'. 178 Additionally, in the immediate term this determination triggered socially significant ripples further afield.
ii Accordingly, KA Finanz illustrated how the impact of a DC determination could, due to the embedded legal significance of the Protocols across the CDS markets, directly affect a third party (i.e. the Austrian Government) and carry with it distributional implications. This is significant because, although the DCs can exert such third party effects, it does not necessarily follow that affected third parties have a right to input into the DC process. Put differently, despite the fact that a DC determination could negatively affect a failed bank under the Austrian Government's (public) oversight (i.e. KA Finanz), the Austrian Government itself was not entitled to appear before the DC; should it theoretically have wished to attempt to influence the DC determination on Greek CDS from the outset. Nor was the Austrian Government entitled to appeal against the DC determination triggering Greek CDS, in comparison to a potential right of appeal against a decision of a court of law. Overall, these selected events at least demonstrate that the DCs wield significant power to adjudicate on systemically important events in the financial markets; some with potentially public implications. Consequently, it is warranted to consider future prospects for the DCs in the context of wider regulatory reforms in the OTC derivatives markets.
IV. Walking the Tightrope of Regulatory Reform
In the wake of the GFC, public authorities across major trading jurisdictions have instigated significant overhaul of OTC derivative markets
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; essentially with the objective of emulating key infrastructure already prevailing in the exchange-traded (ET) derivatives markets. With a view to mitigating risk and increasing transparency, an increased proportion of OTC derivatives will, where appropriate European Business Organization Law Review 391. 188 For instance, liquidity and legal standardisation will be relevant factors in determining the clearing and exchange-trading-eligibility of instruments. electronic platforms. OTC derivatives will also be reported to central trade registries and/or public authorities. Implementation of this prescription is already well underway in certain jurisdictions, particularly in the US. 189 But a question arises as to precisely what role the DCs will continue to play in an environment where certain previously privately and bilaterally traded ISDA-governed CDS contracts will now be clearing through CCPs.
Basically, central clearinghouses (CCPs) are entities which stand in the middle of OTC derivative transactions and thereby become the counterparty to each market participant using their services. CCPs aim to ensure prudent risk management of trades, as well as smooth post-trade settlement. CCPs will aim to mitigate risks by ensuring that contracts are, for instance, offsetting and making use of 'multilateral netting'. 190 CCPs are systemically important in their own right and sensitive to the failure of their members. Therefore, in order to underpin their own viability CCPs will thus demand that their members adhere to certain membership criteria. 191 As has been highlighted by Joanne Braithwaite, post-reform contractual arrangements in the OTC derivatives markets are therefore likely to differ somewhat depending on the status of the instruments and market participants in question. 192 If a contract is clearable (or legally subject to the clearing obligation) and both counterparties are members of a relevant clearinghouse (i.e. are 'clearing members'), such instruments and post-trade arrangements are likely to be largely governed from the outset by the standard terms and rules of a particular CCP (which may not necessarily emulate ISDA contract terms).
(FIA) Cleared Derivatives Execution Agreement. 195 The engagement between the clearing member and the CCP could be governed by the CCP's own standard terms. 196 A substantial number of contracts will also not be clearing-eligible under public regulatory reforms and, although subject to increased capital and risk management (e.g. collateralisation) requirements, will continue to be traded privately and bilaterally under the ISDA Master Agreement. Specifically in relation to credit derivatives, including CDS, it seems likely at time of writing that a considerable number of these contracts will continue to be traded in this space. 197 In fact, ISDA has suggested that a significant proportion of CDS contracts, including 'single-name' CDS, will not be eligible for central clearing.
198 Accordingly, there is little reason to suspect that non-cleared CDS will not continue to be governed by prevailing ISDA documentation and processes, including the DC mechanism. And it also seems likely that certain CDS contracts subject to a clearing obligation could, in theory at least, be governed by key aspects of the DC mechanism; if not by ISDA-inspired documentation and definitions more generally. This perspective is supported by the fact that CCPs have been co-opted onto certain ISDA DCs; albeit as observers. 199 ISDA has also published amendments to its rules enabling CCPs to explicitly afford the DCs jurisdiction over cleared CDS. 200 Taken together and despite broader market infrastructure reforms, these factors suggest that the ISDA DCs are likely to wield significant influence outside, and possibly within, clearing processes.
Therefore, the ISDA DCs may continue to occupy a sensitive position in the financial markets. But this will also arguably force them to walk a somewhat precarious tightrope in the context of broader public regulatory reforms. On the one hand, ISDA may be anxious to maintain as much 'regulatory share' 201 as possible, while on the other avoid raising the hackles of public policy makers. However,
as the Greek crisis has demonstrated, public threats to ISDA's power may flare up from time to time, particularly in cases involving sovereigns which trigger a broader interest. 202 Additionally, as has been demonstrated in other contexts, such as the interbank rate-setting controversy, socially important private governance arrangements are susceptible to public intervention in the event of perceived failures. 203 Indeed, by time of writing ISDA itself had been drawn into this controversy by virtue of a public regulatory investigation into ISDA's own (hitherto little known) derivatives benchmark rate ('ISDAFIX').
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The ISDA DCs will presumably be conscious that public intervention is a threat and thus remain cognisant of their potential influence and associated responsibilities. At time of writing public policy makers have not indicated that they are inclined to interfere with the DC process. Nonetheless, certain issues around third party implications and potential conflicts of interest may continue to haunt the DCs. As such, in the longer term it may be desirable for all stakeholders to consider the merits of further reform of overall institutional governance in these markets, as has already been proposed elsewhere.
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Conclusions
Regulatory arrangements for the OTC derivatives market serve to demonstrate the resilience of transnational private regulation, in a transnational business governance interactions (TBGI) environment subject both to the significant external shock of the global financial crisis, and intense pressure on governmental actors to demonstrate that they are acting effectively to reduce or eliminate the kinds of risk which created a global financial meltdown. 206 How can such resilience be explained? It is not credible to think that policy makers might continue to think of OTC derivatives as a purely technical area, in which regulatory decision making at worst affects only bilateral interests of parties to transactions. The third party effects of the way in which contracts are written, the protections granted by legislation, and also the decisions of the Credit Derivatives Determinations Committees (DCs) are of great potential significance in a wide range of transactions. The lack of transparency associated with private arrangements and their impact has been a particular source of criticism. 207 An alternative explanation for the continuing acceptance of ISDA is, recognising the effects on interests, that a judgement has been made which affords priority to the expertise of those practitioners involved, and which is accepting of the mechanisms through which no one set of interests (whether individual, for example of a particular bank, or collective, for example of banks as a whole) is able to dominate decisions. There is an implicit delegation of power to make decisions of potentially great significance, but which in most cases secure little attention.
In this case of TBGI between state and non-state actors, these occur in both operational and policy spheres. Operationally there is a strong stake for governments both directly in relation to determinations concerned with sovereign debt and indirectly in addressing fall-out, for example to banks and sovereigns, arising from sovereign debt decisions. There is also a regulatory dimension to operational relationships, as decisions about CDS instruments affect public regulatory issues, such as compliance by banks and others with capital adequacy and other prudential requirements.
At a policy level, interactions are concerned with the nature and extent of delegation to private governance institutions generally (including in this sphere not only ISDA and other trade associations, but also credit rating agencies, whose decisions affect creditworthiness and feed into public regulatory decision making), and to ISDA in particular. The delegation to ISDA over credit determinations is implicit, as if the structure has been thrown up as part of the market mechanism, requiring of intervention only where justified by market failure.
Whilst continuing events associated with the global financial crisis (GFC) encourage stronger scrutiny by national and supranational governmental bodies of private governance arrangements such as ISDA, it is striking how embedded private governance arrangements remain. Indeed, the crisis was a key factor in further crystallising ISDA's role through the systemization of CDS determinations, as it became increasingly important for such decisions to be made on a centralised basis, rather than on a bilateral and ad hoc basis. It is not clear that governmental actors would necessarily bring either greater legitimacy or expertise to the general task of the DCs. At the same time, whilst the function remains privately organised, it is nonetheless capable of exerting 'socially significant' third party effects in certain circumstances. This may continue to raise certain legitimacy and transparency issues, especially in cases where sovereigns and publicly supported financial institutions are at issue.
As a private actor at the centre of a regulatory regime with significant features of TBGI, ISDA comes across as a survivor, able to adapt itself to changing conditions, external shocks and challenges to the legitimacy of private regulation engendered by the GFC. This characteristic, above all, perhaps demonstrates the essentially political character of such private governance arrangements, even where key private regulators may protest that their roles are primarily technical. 
